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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT P. MORRIS, and 
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, 
INC., 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
JOHN PRICE ASSOCIATES, 
INC., 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 15660 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The nature of the case and disposition in the lower 
court are thoroughly discussed in Appellant's initial brief, 
and will not be repeated here. For convenience, references 
to the Respondents' brief will be shown as (R's brief), and 
the Transcript of Trial as (Tr.). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE "PROCURING CAUSE" STANDARD IS DIFFER-
ENT FOR "BROKERS II THAN FOR "FINDERS II. 
There are no Utah cases recognizing recovery based upon 
a claim for a finder's fee, as opposed to a broker's fee. 
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Plaintiffs argue that "the distinction is quite narrow" (R' s 
brief 9), and that the trial court's instr~ction number 11 
"properly defined the term 'procuring cause' whether Morris 
is deemed to be a 'finder' or a 'broker'" (R's brief 9). 
While recovery for either a broker or a finder requires the 
test of procuring cause, there is a significant difference 
in the type of performance required. 
It should first be noted that nearly all of the cases 
dealing with finders are set in the context of "business 
opportunity finders", or in specialized fields such as 
speculative oil and gas leases. Finders are generally not 
regulated or licensed by the states, while real estate 
brokers are universally so regulated. 
Plaintiffs cite several cases in their brief at pp. 9-10, 
setting forth the standard for finders, none of which deal 
with real estate sales or leasing transactions. (Amerofina-
business merger opportunity; Minichiello-steck investment 
opportunity; Bittner-business purchase opportunity; Freeman-
stock investment opportunity; Consolidated Oil-oil and gas 
lease). They argue that the standard for finders in those 
cases requires only an introduction of the parties, and 
setting "the chain of event in motion which results in the 
sale". (R's brief 10, citing Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. 
v. Roberts, 425 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1967)). 
-2-
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In direct contrast with the Consolidated Oil finder's 
standard is the broker's standard, set forth in Midwest 
Realty Co. v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 341 F.Supp. 1008 
(E.D. Mo. 1972): 
A broker is not entitled to recover a commission 
if his acts were merely one of a chain of causes 
producing a sale or contributing in some degree 
thereto unless his acts constituted the efficient 
and procuring cause thereof. Id. at 1012-13. 
The Consolidated Oil case itself points out the distinc-
tion between oil and gas finders and real estate brokers: 
The custom and usage in the oil and gas industry 
in regard to brokers and finders are spelled out 
in great detail by this record. The usual type 
of broker's commission case in the regulated real 
estate business in Colorado, as is urged by the 
defendant, is not necessar1ly 1n point here ••.• 
The law is that the right of a broker to recover 
a commission is dependent upon the terms of the 
agreement and the performance expected of him. 
(Citations omitted). The measure of performance 
of an oil and gas broker or finder would seem to 
require only that he present a property available 
for acquisition and then procure any requested 
information needed to evaluate the property. His 
compensation is dependent upon the subsequent 
purchase, but not upon his efforts toward accom-
plishing the purchase. 425 P.2d at 286-87. 
(Emphasis added). 
Thus, the standard for a real estate broker requires 
more than just setting the chain of events in motion. As 
stated in Reed v. Taylor, 322 P.2d 147 (Wyo. 1958): 
-3-
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The mere introduction of a prospect to an owner, 
or even the broker's participation in unsuccess-
ful negotiations between the parties Joes not 
earn the broker a commission. In such a 
case the introduction of a prospect is merely 
one step in providing the foundation from which 
the broker may develop a sale. Id. at 150. 
The Utah case of Brooks v. Geo. Q. Cannon Assn., 53 Utah 
304, 178 P. 589 (1919), discussed at length in Appellant's 
initial brief, may have come closer to a fact situation appro-
priate for a finder's standard, as it involved a loan broker 
rather than a real estate broker. Nevertheless, the Utah 
court stated that the procuring cause standard required the 
broker to be the "efficient procuring or producing cause of 
the transaction relied upon by him". The efforts of the 
broker in Brooks, while quite similar to those of the 
plaintiff Morris, were held insufficient to entitle him 
to a commission. 
Plaintiffs erroneously cite the Utah case of Frederick 
May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 ( 1962), for 
the proposition that "The agent need only 'bring to the 
attention of the buyer that the property is for sale'" (R's 
brief 14). Actually, the Frederick May case held that the 
broker had not met the procuring cause standard, and that a 
directed verdict for the seller against the broker seeking a 
commission was proper. Although the purchaser (S&H) became 
aware of the subject property through the broker (May), 
-4-
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"[a]ll of the negotiations between them were on the basis 
that S&H was only a prospective financial backer of another 
person who was interested in making the purchase". 368 P.2d 
at 269. Thus, plaintiffs' reliance on the "bring to the 
attention of the buyer" language is misplaced, and more is 
required to meet the procuring cause requirement in Utah. 
Illustrative of the distinction between finders and 
brokers is the case of Bittner v. American-Marietta Co., 162 
F.Supp. 486 (E.D.Ill. 1958). Plaintiffs rely on this case 
for the proposition that "[a]ll the 'finder' is required to 
do is bring the seller to the attention of the purchaser". 
(R's brief 10). Plaintiffs neglect to include language from 
the same page of that decision which points out the distinc-
tion between finders and brokers: 
A mere "finder" would not constitute a broker. 
There is no reliance upon the "finder" to perform 
the duties of the broker in negotiating the con-
tract. 
In New York the distinction between a "finder" 
and a "broker" has been recognized. In Kuffler 
v. List, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 144 F.Supp. 776, 778, the 
court held that there was a "difference between 
finding a business for others to do and acting as 
a broker in doing the business". 162 F.Supp. at 
488. (Emphasis added). 
In Utah, to be a procuring cause required more than 
being a finder in the business opportunity sense--more than 
"setting the chain of events in motion". It requires being 
-5-
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the cause of a meeting of the minds--being the efficient 
procuring cause of the transaction. 
POINT II 
INSTRUCTION 11 STATES THE STANDARD FOR A 
FINDER, NOT A BROKER. 
As discussed above, while a finder's test of procuring 
cause may be satisfied by less, a broker must be more than 
"merely one of a chain of causes". Midwest Realty, supra. 
Further, "the negotiations conducted by the broker must have 
progressed to a point where success seems imminent". Hampton 
Park Corp. v. T. D. Burgess Co., Inc., 311 A.2d 35, 42 (Md. 
1973). This case goes on to state: 
In the final analysis, the broker must establish 
that he is the primary, proximate and procuring 
cause of the sale, (citation omitted); and it is 
not sufficient that the broker has merely "pranted 
the seed from which the harvest was reaped". (Em-
phasls added). 311 A. 2d at 42. 
Plaintiffs admit in their "Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Judgment N.O.V. or New Trial" that "instruction 
11 correctly states the law of procuring cause as it applies 
to finders". (Memorandum at 6). Plaintiffs now contend 
that instruction 11 "properly defined the term 'procuring 
cause' whether Morris is deemed to be a 'finder' or a 
'broker'". (R's brief 9). However, in light of the above 
discussion regarding the distinction between the procuring 
cause standard of brokers and finders, it is clear that the 
-6-
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language of instruction 11 ("plaintiffs must have set a 
chain of events in motion that finally resulted in the 
lease. (T]his does not mean that plaintiffs must have 
participated at every step of negotiations or even in most 
of them," etc.) is, as plaintiffs originally contended, the 
standard for finders. It conveys the clear impression that 
plaintiff need only start the ball rolling, i.e., introduce 
the parties, and do nothing further. 
To uphold such a finder's standard in the instant case 
would be devastating precedent. If a real estate broker 
could recover for "only two phone calls" (R's brief 10), in 
a fact setting such as the instant one, no one would dare 
talk with such a person. Every introduction or suggestion 
by a broker could bind a seller to a commission. As in the 
instant case, the broker could sit back while doing nothing 
for 18 months or more, and then claim a commission for the 
earlier introduction. 
Pass v. Industrial Asphalt of Cal., Inc., 239 Cal.App.2d 
776, 49 Cal.R. 190 (1966) involved a claimed finder's fee 
for introducing the seller of a business to a prospective 
purchaser who later purchased a different business from the 
same seller. Therein, the court reversed a judgment for the 
finder, stating: 
-7-
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A contrary rule which would allow a finder or 
broker to obtain a commission for a cransaction 
foreign to the purposes of his employment, and 
with which he had no connection, would be absurd. 
One would scarcely dare to employ a finder for a 
particular purpose if the employment permitted the 
finder to sit back, do nothing, and claim a fee 
for transactions completely outside the purposes 
of his employment. 49 Cal.R. at 195. 
This is exactly the reason for the procuring cause test 
for real estate brokers, and instruction 11 was a prejudicial-
ly inaccurate statement of the Utah requirement. 
POINT III 
THE LETTER AUTHORIZING A 6% COMMISSION 
CONTEMPLATED AS CONSIDERATION THAT PLAIN-
TIFFS PERFORM THE SERVICES OF A BROKER. 
To have earned the 6% commission, plaintiffs must have 
performed the duties contemplated under the contract. As 
the Utah Supreme Court stated in Frederick May, suera: 
[T]he extent to which the broker's efforts must 
induce the sale depends on the terms used in the 
contract and the understanding and intention of 
the parties in making such agreement and the facts 
and circumstances of the case. (Emphasis added) 
368 P.2d at 269. 
The commission recited, 6%, is the standard commission 
paid to a real estate broker for his services as a broker. 
As Victor Ayers, Morris' employer, testified (Tr. 43-44): 
Q. Did you see that letter when--while Mr. Morris 
was still employed with you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you discuss the letter with Mr. Morris? 
-8-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
he: 
A. Well, I had discussed with Mr. Morris prior 
to his getting that letter that that's the 
kind of protection he should obta1n in work-
ing on a project such as that because it was 
not listed at the time with any broker. 
Plaintiff Morris testifed that he told John Price that 
Thought I had a good crack at a tenant that I had 
been working with over a period of time, a major 
tenant and was going to Los Angeles to see them, 
would like to take a set of plans and would he 
give me a letter assuring me of a commission if I 
did so. 
He said, "Yes, come on down". (Tr. 19). 
There is nothing from that testimony, or any other, 
which would infer that he was to only be a finder, and not a 
broker. To the contrary, Mr. Ayers testimony, above, gives 
the impression that such was the normal type of listing agree-
ment for a broker to obtain in working on such a project. 
In Frederick May, supra, the Utah cvurt stated: 
It is generally recognized that a broker's author-
ity to sell property is not exclusive and does not 
require the payment of the commission to the 
broker upon a sale not procured by him, unless 
made so by the contract of employment in clear and 
unequivocal terms or by necessary implication. 
This brokerage contract is what is called a 
general listing agreement which leaves the owner 
free to sell the property himself as long as he 
does so in good faith. Under such contracts a 
broker must be the procuring cause in order to be 
entitled to a commission for such sale. (Emphasis 
added). 368 P.2d at 268-69. 
-9-
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Mr. Machan, who negotiated the IBM lease for the Price 
organization, testified that plaintiffs did "absolutely 
nothing" that resulted in the procuring of the lease by the 
Price organization (Tr. 67), and the testimony of IBM's 
personnel was to the same effect. 
John Price, president of defendant, testified: 
I gave him parameters of the rent. I told him to 
bring the tenant in and that he would be -- have 
to be in the negotiations and put this deal 
together. That was my exact conversation at the 
very, very beginning. I didn't agree to have any 
other relationship with Rob. He had to come in 
and put it together because I have a staff that 
can do that so if he's going to earn a commission, 
he has a tenant he's got to come in and do the 
work. (Tr. 96). 
Against that factual background, with no evidence to 
the contrary, plaintiffs assert that they were only required 
to introduce the parties, let the deal sit for 18 months, 
let IBM and Price do all the work, and then collect $22,000.00 
as a full 6% broker's commission for acting as a finder. 
That contention is unsupported in the evidence or in the 
law. 
As stated above, the extent of the required performance 
must be implied to support the otherwise silent written 
contract. This implied additional term would constitute an 
implied-in-fact agreement, as defined recently by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205 (Utah 1976). 
-10-
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Fowler coincidentally dealt with a real estate salesperson/ 
broker. The court held that there was no implied-in-fact 
agreement as to the broker's commission because, as in tne 
instant case, there was no mutual assent indicating an 
intent to be bound to a contract with certain terms: 
Defendant contends there is no evidence to sustain 
a finding there was an implied-in-fact contract. 
With this contention we must agree, for there was 
no evidence of any action or conduct that reason-
ably could be construed as a manifestation of 
mutual assent 1nd1cat1ng an 1ntention to be bound 
on a contract whose terms were certain. The 
terms of the alleged agreement are unknown, vi~ 
the duties, conditions, and compensation. Defen-
dant believed the use of plaintiff's license was 
gratuitous; plaintiff expected to receive the 
entire fruits of defendant's contract. Their 
conduct cannot be construed as a manifestation of 
mutual assent to a contract whose terms are 
certain. (Emphasis added). Id. at 208-09. 
Similarly, in the instant case the performance require-
ment of the agreement was silent. Thus, the court should 
have instructed the jury clearly on the applicable aspects 
of contract law and the terms which must be implied-in-fact 
in order to establish a binding agreement. There was no 
such instruction. 
Further, the court refused to give defendant's proposed 
special verdict, over defendant's objection "that the general 
verdict allows the Jury to speculate on matters of contract 
law regarding which they were not instructed and allows them 
to imply elements into the contract arrangement which may or 
may not have existed". (Tr. 116). 
-11-
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There was no evidence that less performance was required 
or anticipated than that of a broker to earn the standard 6% 
commission. The fact that the commission was the standard 
6% itself infers that the performance required must be that 
of a broker. Yet, the instruction given by the court set 
out the standard for a finder, a lower standard of perform-
ance than contemplated by the parties, and none not supported 
by Utah law in the absence of a clear and unambiguous 
contract to the contrary. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment of the lower 
court should be reversed. ~ 
Respectfully submitted this ~---day of December, 
1978. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
~P~a7u~l~~~D~r-o~z~--~~--~~-----
Attorneys for Appellant 
John Price Associates, Inc. 
-12-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered two {2) 
copies of the foregoing ~ly Brief of Appellant to counsel 
for Respondents this J - day of December, 1978. 
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